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CONCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS' AGENCY IN

LEGAL ETHICS SCHOLARSHIP
Susan D. Carle*
I have recently commented elsewhere in the pages of this journal on
one of many pressing problems I see facing the legal profession in the
twenty-first century.1 I will focus here on what I think is one of the
most urgent problems faced by those who study the pressing problems
of the legal profession-i.e., legal ethics professors and scholars. That
problem is how to conceive of lawyers' individual and collective
"agency" in working to reform the profession and society more
generally. By this I mean: how should we evaluate lawyers' ability to
bring about meaningful change in the enormously complex, resistant,
and ambiguous set of institutions we lump together when we refer to
"the legal profession"?
The problem of how to conceive of individual and collective agency
is, of course, a problem that pervades legal scholarship. On the one
hand, the idea that people at a fundamental level "choose" how they
conduct their lives is enormously appealing, having roots deep in
classical philosophical liberalism and related Anglo-American
jurisprudential justifications for holding individuals "morally
accountable" for their acts.2 On the other hand, strong conceptions of
unconstrained agency defy our observations of the way in which social
position affects life trajectory. Not only do we observe this
phenomenon reflected in our personal social worlds, but a large
sociological and historical literature amply documents the constraints
imposed on individuals' opportunities in law as a result of structural
Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
1. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70
Fordham L Rev. 719 (2001) (arguing that the profession should grant more "honor"
to lawyers who serve middle-income clients).
2- See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992) (describing how the law invokes notions of "free will" as a
basis for holding individuals responsible for their actions); Frank Michelman, The
Subject of Liberalism, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1807, 1807 (1994) (describing John Rawls's
liberal conception of "the subject" as one who has the "ability to form, revise, and
rationally pursue [his or her] own conception of what gives value to [his or her] life");
see also Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual
Autonomy 27-53 (John Christman ed., 1989) (describing various liberal conceptions
of autonomy). See generally The Inner Citadel, supra (collecting various essays on
liberal conception of the self).
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barriers including race, gender, class, religion, and ethnicity. This
literature further establishes that some of these barriers persist
through nearly invisible but no less pernicious mechanisms, despite
efforts to eradicate them.4
One of the many virtues of Deborah Rhode's new work, In the
Interests of Justice,5 is her sensitivity to the ways in which certain
structural factors, such as sex and race, continue to affect lawyers'
lives. Rhode is well aware that traditionally excluded outsiders, such
as people of color and women, still do not have the same
opportunities -or to say the same thing another way, still have more
constrained individual agency-than do traditional insiders as a group.
Rhode is, moreover, willing to come right out and say so, mincing no
words despite the discomfort such statements may cause leaders of a
profession that prides itself on securing justice.6
Rhode is, furthermore, well aware of the way in which the
organization of the legal profession cramps the life projects and
opportunities for meaningful careers of even the profession's most
privileged members.
Rhode thus writes about the discontent
experienced even by well-paid, large-firm lawyers facing "the
structure of practice" today.7 In short, Rhode is not na'fve about the
many forces-social, historic, demographic, and economic-that
constrain lawyers and the legal profession in their capacity for change.
Yet Rhode's impressive synthesis of scholarship on legal ethics and
the legal profession over the past several decades is extraordinary in
the artful way it combines critical and structural analysis with
concrete, straightforward, pragmatic prescriptions for change. Rhode
straddles these two objectives-providing sophisticated structural
analysis and workable suggestions for solutions-with deceptive ease,
giving the kind of virtuoso performance perhaps best appreciated by
those who have discovered in their own writing that it is a great deal
easier to criticize than to put forth a constructive agenda. But making
3. Some classics include Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and
Social Change in Modem America (1976); Virginia G. Drachman, Sisters in Law:
Women Lawyers in Modem American History (1998); and J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
Emancipation (1993).
4. See, e.g., Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors:
Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession,64 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1995); The
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Commission on Women in the Profession,
Responses to Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal
Profession,65 Fordham L. Rev. 561 (1996); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitua Gulati, Why
Are There So Few Black Lawyers in CorporateLaw Firms? An InstitutionalAnalysis,
84 Cal. L. Rev. 493 (1996).
5. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession

(2000).

6. See, e.g., id. at 12-13, 23-24, 38-44, 192-96, 208-09 (describing various forms of
discrimination in the legal profession and legal education).
7. See, e.g., id. at 23-38 (describing various studies documenting lawyer
dissatisfaction and analyzing its many sources in economics and other aspects of the
profession's organization).
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concrete proposals for change is exactly what Rhode does, on an
extremely wide variety of topics, in a way that will be invaluable as an
agenda and reference guide for years to come.'
In short, Rhode accomplishes the impressive feat of proposing a
comprehensive agenda for change without ignoring the many
powerful structural forces that constrain lawyers' choices in law.
Implicit in her approach are important assumptions about agency that
avoid casting lawyers' capacity for change either too broadly or too
narrowly. On the one hand, Rhode does not resort to an overly
optimistic or naYve view of the profession's capacity for reform; on the
other, Rhode avoids an overly deterministic or fatalistic attitude about
the difficulties of making meaningful progress in our complex,
troubled "post modem" world. Rhode never suggests that all we need
to do is decide that the profession should reform itself and change will
come about-she does not, in other words, appear to assume
unrestrained free will, at the individual or collective level.
At the same time, despite her structural sensibilities, Rhode does
not succumb to the pitfalls to which some self-labeled "poststructuralist" theorists of the legal profession arguably fall victim.9
These theorists, grimly determined to face the facts of unintended
consequences, resilient power imbalances, and unconscious
reactionism, sometimes appear to eradicate virtually all potential for
human agency in discussing the state of today's legal profession. To
take one example, the post-structuralists' leading theorist on "the
legal subject" writes:
If the liberal subject disappears from the scene, a number of very
troublesome questions immediately surface: who (or what) is
controlling the levers running the social machinery? And if there's
8. Thus, for example, Rhode proposes that lawyers: bear heightened
responsibility for avoiding harm to third parties, including possible resort to
"whistleblowing"-i.e., publicly disclosing client wrongdoing-to achieve this end, id.
at 18, 96-105, 114; promote alternative dispute resolution procedures and allow nonlawyer specialists to assist in client self-representation, id. at 18-19, 134-41; loosen
restrictions on advertising and solicitation, id. at 148-49; and increase enforcement of
malpractice and unethical fee and billing practices and encourage specialized sectors
of the legal profession to promulgate and enforce their own ethics rules, id. at 21, 15883. Another set of her reform proposals focuses on workplace conditions, including
promoting employers' adoption of more flexible policies on hours and leave, better
mentoring systems, and increased opportunities for pro bono and other public service
work. Id. at 45-48. Finally, she makes numerous suggestions about how law schools
and legal education could better promote the values she finds underemphasized in the
legal profession today. Id. at 185-206; see also id at 207-13 (summarizing her
numerous proposals).
9. I do not mean here to be denouncing post-structuralism generally, believing
instead that at least some of the theorists Americans classify as "post-structuralists"
offer a great deal to the study of the legal profession. I am simply suggesting that
more work needs to be done in accounting theoretically for observed phenomena
concerning the transmission and transformation of the values and structures of the
legal profession across generations.
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no one operating the levers, then what has been the effect of all that
good, admirable, serious, normative legal thought?
As legal thinkers, we like to think we are doing good, normative
legal work-advancing noble causes and the like-but if the liberal

subject is no longer operating the levers, our work product can take
on a different character. We may simply be rehearsing and
reproducing the instrumentalist logic of bureaucratic practices....
Viewed in this light, we can understand normative legal thought
not as a noble attempt to criticize and reform the structures and
practices of bureaucratic domination, but rather as a kind of
discourse that has already been unconsciously captivated by those
very same structures and practices. The pathways, the issues, the
problems of normative legal thought are already constituted by
bureaucratic domination.... Rather than contributing to our
understanding or to the realization of the good or the right, all this
normative argument simply perpetuates a false aesthetic of social
life-one that prevents "us" from even recognizing the sort of
bureaucratic practices that constitute and channel our thought and
action. 10
In contrast, Rhode appears to envision a mix of bureaucratic
constraint and opportunity, conscious control and unintended
consequence.
Rhode's approach to the question of lawyers' individual and
collective agency is only implicit in her work-she does not explicitly
address the issue of individual and collective agency in the formation
and transformation of lawyers' ethics. This seems to me an issue that
deserves further attention among legal ethics scholars. A workable
conception of lawyers' individual and collective agency must, as
Rhode's does, balance an awareness that lawyers' opportunities for
transformative action are strongly constrained by structural forces
with an appreciation of lawyers' capacity for creative reform.
I will give two briefly summarized examples from my own research
to illustrate this point. In a pair of articles on the NAACP's early
litigation strategies, I compared how two differently situated
generations of NAACP lawyers dealt with the potential
inconsistencies between the NAACP's "test case" litigation strategies
and traditional legal ethics norms that forbade certain techniques the
NAACP used, such as "creating" litigation where it would not have
existed otherwise and soliciting plaintiffs.
I showed that white
10. Pierre J. Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1739-40
(1991) (citations omitted).
11. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class,and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (19101920), 20 Law & Hist. Rev. 97 (2002) [hereinafter Carle, Race, Class, and Legal
Ethics]; Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP
(PartII), 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 281 (2001) [hereinafter Carle, From Buchanan
to Button].
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patrician lawyers such as Morefield Storey and others on the
NAACP's first national legal ethics committee in the period between
1910-1920 displayed little concern about the potential legal ethics
violations involved in these practices, and I argued that this was so
because they were comfortable in their elite standing in the bar.1 2 In
contrast, when African-American lawyers Charles Hamilton Houston
and Thurgood Marshall took over as the directors of the NAACP's
legal strategy in the mid-1930s, they took a very different perspective
on legal ethics issues. As Mark Tushnet first documented, 3 both
Houston and Marshall displayed great concern about the NAACP's
vulnerability to legal ethics charges-quite correctly, it turned out, as
shown by southern states' subsequent attacks on the NAACP on legal
ethics grounds in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.4 I
argued that a host of complex factors accounts for the different legal
ethics perspectives of Storey, as opposed to Houston and Marshall,
including the difference in the structural position of Houston and
Marshall compared to Storey and the other elite white lawyers who
directed the NAACP's legal strategy in an earlier era.' 5 As AfricanAmerican lawyers, Houston and Marshall were well aware that,
despite their excellent educational credentials, they retained an
"outsider" status in the profession that made them particularly
6
vulnerable to politically motivated legal ethics attacks.'
This example provides one illustration of the potentially
constraining nature of structural position in the profession. But
Houston and Marshall also exemplify the potential for lawyers'

transformative agency as perhaps few other lawyers of the twentieth
12- See Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics, supra note 11, at 100, 143-44.
13. See, eg., Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated
Education, 1925-1950, at 105 (1987) (describing Houston's concern that involvement
in particular cases might lead to charges of "trumped up" litigation); Mark V.
Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 19361961, at 117 & n.4 (1994) [hereinafter Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law] (quoting
correspondence between Marshall and Walter White in 1940, in which Marshall
advised White that asking a teachers' association for -'contributions to the NAACP
on condition that we file [a] case for them"' was "'clearly within the statute forbidding
solicitation of legal business,"' and warned, "'All of the states in the South are
convinced that they cannot defeat these cases in court and are looking for any means
at all to stop them."'); id. at 274 (describing legal ethics problems NAACP
encountered); see also Carle, From Buchanan to Button, supra note 11, at 297-99
(presenting further archival research on Houston and Marshall's concerns about
ethics charges).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of the southern states' attacks on the
NAACP on legal ethics and other grounds, see Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law,
supra note 13, at 272-300.
15. See Carle, From Buchanan to Button, supra note 11, at 298.
16. Of course, the NAACP's increased visibility and success contributed greatly to
this threat of backlash, which undoubtedly would have occurred regardless of who
was in charge of legal strategy. My point is simply that Houston and Marshall
immediately exhibited a much greater concern about this threat than the NAACP's
earlier, elite white lawyers had.
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century can. Houston's biographer, Genna Rae McNeil, best captures
the magnitude of Houston's achievement in this respect, describing
how Houston took the materials of his social context, including his
personal experiences with racism and his Harvard Law School
education, and transformed them into a vision of civil rights lawyers as
social engineers. 7 My study of Houston's law school notes reveals a
fascinating link between Houston's intense study of the tenets of
sociological jurisprudence with one of his law school mentors, Roscoe
Pound, 18 and his subsequent vision of lawyers as social engineers.
Houston took Pound's ideas and profoundly reconstructed them to fit
his own context and goals. Pound's influence was crucial, but
Houston's creative agency provided ingredients that no poststructuralist account can fully dismiss.
A second example concerns the reform efforts of Florence Kelley,
perhaps the most important early twentieth century white female
"public interest" lawyer (though largely unrecognized as such).
Kelley was the leader of the National Consumers' League, a leading
white women's social reform organization in the decades around the
turn of the twentieth century.19 In reviewing a recent biography of
Kelley, I examined the way in which she took the ingredients of her
social context, including her class privilege and an ideology that
espoused women's special aptitude for social welfare concerns, and
used them to promote a maternalist social welfare politics that
provided an important underpinning for the later New Deal.2" I
argued that Kelley was both empowered and restrained by the
conventional notions of her time concerning women's proper place in
the public arena. Indeed, Kelley went so far as to hide from public
view her status as a well-trained and licensed lawyer, overseeing the
organization's legal work behind the scenes. She relied on male
lawyers to provide the organization's public legal face, a strategy that
would cost her dearly when she eventually clashed with those male
lawyers on strategy decisions.2'
In somewhat the same way as Houston did, Kelley faced constraints
imposed by virtue of her social identity and, like Houston, drew on
17. Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the
Struggle for Civil Rights (1983).
1& See Carle, From Buchanan to Button, supra note 11, at 295-96.
19. The National Consumers' League, for example, was the organization that
sponsored the famous so-called "Brandeis brief' in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908).
As feminists are fond of pointing out, Kelley's lieutenant, Josephine
Goldmark, in fact drafted that entire brief, so that it is arguably misnamed. See Susan
D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer's Persona,22 Harv. Women's L.J.
239,258 & n.70 (1999).
20. See Carle, supra note 19, at 258-73 (reviewing Kathryn Kish Sklar's biography
of Kelley, Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work).
21. Id. at 259-62; see also Susan D. Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono
Lawyering: Some HistoricalReflections, 9 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 81, 91-92

(2001).
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the resources provided by her social context in exhibiting remarkably
creative agency, both as an individual and in motivating others to a
form of collective agency that had a lasting impact on U.S. law and
social policy.
These two examples could stand with a large number of others in
showing how lawyers-in ways sometimes modest and sometimes
significant, through a combination of witting and unwitting exertions
of individual and collective agency2-remake their profession in each
new generation. This fact of transformative agency is, in my view,
underappreciated in some of the leading theoretical perspectives
espoused in the legal academy today. I thus argue in a project on
which I am now at work for a revival of the more robust views of
human agency contained in the theoretical perspectives of the early
American pragmatists John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and
Charles S. Pierce.' That topic is obviously far beyond the scope of
this short comment, but it is perhaps not insignificant that Rhode hails
from an institution housing some of the chief proponents of the
pragmatist revival in American law, such as Margaret Jane Radin and
Thomas Grey.
A pragmatist would note that, in every citation of authority, every
idea included or discarded in her book, Rhode contributes to
recreating and redefining the profession for new generations. Were I
to have any criticism of Rhode's work, it might be that she could
display even more sensitivity to the way in which her citation practices
perpetuate hierarchies, organized on axes other than race and sex
(such as social class, educational credentials, and institutional
affiliation), in the legal profession as well as its sub-sector of the legal
academy. Perhaps Rhode views these types of class-based hierarchies
as less pernicious than hierarchies based on sex and race.24 Whatever
her views on these loaded questions,'
Rhode has provided an
enormously valuable and inspiring primer to bar leaders and law
professors who feel an obligation, not only to critique the profession,
but also to use the power and privilege of their positions to make
concrete efforts at reform.

22. For a wonderful example of a lawyer's unwitting transformation of
professional norms through his legal reform work, see Daniel R. Ernst, Lav,yers
Against Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism (1995) (describing
how anti-labor lawyer's efforts to promote individual rights jurisprudence heralded a
jurisprudence based on notions of interest group pluralism).
23. See Susan D. Carle, A PragmatistTheory of the Self (draft manuscript on file

with author).
24. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 38-44 (arguing against "myths of meritocracy").

25. On the extremely loaded nature of class-based hierarchies in the legal
profession and in United States society more generally, see Carle, supra note 1, at
720-22.
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